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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, % 
Plaintiff-Appellee, : Case No. 900110-CA 
v. t 
JOHN FLETCHER PENDERGRASS, : Category No. 2 
Defendant-Appellant• : 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This appeal is from convictions for murder in the 
second degree, a first degree felony, in violation of Utah Code 
Ann. S 76-5-203 (1990), and theft, a second degree felony, in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-404 (1990). This Court has 
jurisdiction to hear the appeal under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-
3(2) (j) (Supp. 1989). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
AND STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
The issues presented in this appeal are: 
1. Did the trial court properly deny defendant's 
request for a jury instruction on the lesser included offense of 
manslaughter on the grounds that there was no evidence to support 
such a verdict? Jury instructions are within the discretion of 
the trial court and will only be reviewed for prejudicial error. 
State v. Lopez# 789 P.2d 39, 45 (Utah Ct. App. 1990); State v. 
Hansen, 734 P.2d 421, 428 (Utah 1986); State v. Knight, 734 P.2d 
913, 919-920 (Utah 1987). 
2. Did the trial court abuse its discretion in 
excluding, on grounds of insufficient foundation, expert opinions 
as to what effect defendant's voluntary drug ingestion would have 
had on his ability to form the requisite intent? Determinations 
on the admissibility of expert testimony are reviewed only for a 
clear abuse of discretion. Lamb v. Banqart, 525 P.2d 602, 608 
(Utah 1974). 
3. Did the trial court err in instructing the jury on 
the theory of accomplice? This is a matter of discretion, 
reviewable only for prejudicial error as stated in paragraph 1, 
above. 
4. Did the trial court unconstitutionally restrict 
defendant's testimony on the grounds that it had been 
hypnotically enhanced; and, if so, did defendant properly raise 
this issue below and preserve it for appeal? These issues must 
be determined as a matter of law. Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44 
(1987); State v. Verde, 770 P.2d 116, 122 (Utah 1989) 
5. Was there sufficient evidence presented at trial to 
sustain defendant's conviction for murder in the second degree? 
A jury verdict will be viewed in the light most favorable to 
upholding it and will only be reversed where reasonable minds 
must have entertained a reasonable doubt that the defendant 
committed the crime of which he was convicted. State v. Johnson, 
774 P.2d 1141, 1147 (Utah 1989); State v. Jonas, 135 Utah Adv. 
Rep. 38, 39 (Utah Ct. App. May 22, 1990). 
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CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
The applicable constitutional provisions, statutes and 
rules for a determination of this case are set forth in the body 
of this brief. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant, John Fletcher Pendergrass, was charged on 
September 1, 1987, with criminal homicide, a first degree felony, 
in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-203 (1990), and theft, a 
second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-404 
(1990) (R. 4-5). On September 28, 1987, the information was 
amended to charge a single count of criminal homicide as a 
capital felony (R. 7-8). From October 11 through 18, 1988, a 
jury trial was held before the Honorable Gordon J. Low, Judge, 
First Judicial District Court, Box Elder County, Utah (R. 302-
07). Guilty verdicts were returned on charges of murder in the 
second degree, a first degree felony, and theft, a second degree 
felony (R. 290). On October 20, 1988, defendant was sentenced to 
the statutory indeterminate terms of five years to life, with a 
five year firearm enhancement term, and one to fifteen years, 
respectively, with all sentences to run concurrently (R. 312). 
On November 16, 1988, defendant filed a motion for new 
trial based on the jury having received, during deliberations, 
documents and photographs not admitted into evidence (R. 322-23). 
The motion was granted on December 14, 1988 (R. 354). On April 
30, 1989, after delays resulting from an interlocutory appeal, 
the trial court ordered defendant to stand trial on charges of 
murder in the second degree, a first degree felony, and theft (R. 
420-21). 
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From September 26 through 29, 1989, a second jury trial 
was commenced before Judge Low (R. 623, 627-30). Verdicts of 
guilty of murder in the second degree, a first degree felony, and 
theft, a second degrese felony, were returned on September 29, 
1989 (R. 622). On October 11, 1989, defendant was sentenced to 
the statutory indeterminate terms of five years to life and one 
to fifteen years, respectively, to run concurrently. Defendant 
was also sentenced to a five year firearm enhancement term, which 
the trial court ordered to run concurrently to the other 
sentences (R. 648-649). Defendant filed a notice of appeal to 
the Utah Supreme Court on November 1, 1989 (R. 653). The case 
was ordered "poured-over" to this Court on February 26, 1990 (R. 
679). 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
On May 27, 1987, defendant decided to join the victim, 
Ray Jenkins, on an overnight fishing trip to Willard Bay in 
northern Utah (T. 31). The two had known each other for several 
years (T. 32, 561-62). In 1987, Ray Jenkins was 22 years old and 
defendant was 18 (T. 56, 557). 
The fishing trip had not been planned. Ray had just 
received another driving violation and felt the need to "get away 
to relax" (T. 31). Because Ray did not have a valid driver's 
license, he needed someone else to drive. When defendant showed 
up at Ray's house in Clearfield, Utah, Ray asked him to join him. 
Defendant agreed, saying he needed "to get away too" (T. 28, 31). 
Ray and defendant left and went to defendant's parents' home in 
Layton to get defendant's camping gear, including a cooler and 
camp lantern (T. 33, 547) 
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Shortly after, they returned and packed Ray's gear (T. 
34). Ray packed two sleeping bags, clothes, food and his .22 
caliber Rueger revolver (T. 35-36). Ray and defendant left in 
Ray's truck, along with Ray's two dogs (T. 39-40). Gloria 
Walters, Ray's live-in girlfriend, estimated that this all took 
place between 2:45 p.m. and 3:30 p.m.. She never saw Ray alive 
again (T. 27, 41). 
Apparently, defendant and Ray then drove to Steven 
Zaremba's house in Layton, Utah (T. 68-69). Steve was not sure 
when they arrived other than in the afternoon, but did remember 
that Ray was upset about receiving another citation (T. 70, 73). 
Ray was upset with defendant because defendant kept asking if he 
could borrow Ray's truck to go to California. Ray repeatedly 
said no, using an "upset" voice (T. 70-71). The two stayed at 
Steve's house for 45 minutes to one hour (T. 74). 
They then returned to defendant's parents' home about 
4:30 p.m. or 5:00 p.m. (T. 527, 549). Defendant's parents 
noticed that both Ray and defendant appeared to be "on something" 
o 
(T. 528, 550-51). Defendant's mother gave him ten dollars and 
they left (T. 552). 
The next persons to see defendant and Ray were some 
fishermen at Willard Bay. Todd Farr and his cousin, Kevin 
Christoffersen, had arrived at Willard Bay around 1:00 or 2:00 in 
The truck was actually registered to Ray's girlfriend, Gloria 
Walters, since Ray did not have a valid driver's license. But, 
Gloria testified that the truck was Ray's (T. 29). 
2 
Defendant testified that before arriving at his parents' home, 
he and Ray had shared a joint of marijuana (T. 578). 
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the afternoon (T. 79). They fished near the inlet at the south 
marina until 4:00 or 4:30 p.m., at which point they tried to 
start Kevin's charger but were unable to do so (T. 80). 
Observing defendant and Ray about a half-mile away, Todd walked 
over to them for help (T. 84). Defendant and Ray came over to 
the Christoffersen vehicle, which still would not start. Kevin 
offered them five dollars to drive Todd to get his truck (T. 85), 
Ray agreed. Todd got his truck and returned to the marina. He 
observed defendant and Ray in the same area fishing. Kevin got 
his charger started and Kevin and Todd left (T. 85-86). It was 
approximately 6:00 or 6:30 in the evening (T. 87-88). 
During their encounter with defendant, Todd and Kevin 
thought defendant appeared to be on drugs or lazy. Todd 
described defendant as follows: 
He was out in another world because he 
just — you couldn't talk to him. And it was 
like he was on drugs. I'm almost positive he 
was on. But he just didn't seem coherent. 
He was lazy. I mean, even the Jenkins guy 
asked. He was the only one that could get 
him to do anything, get him out of the car. 
Nobody else could get him out of the truck. 
(T. 91). Kevin thought that defendant: 
might have been smoking pot . . . . He just 
seemed weird, the way he just sat there and 
spaced-out looking and just a grin or a smirk 
more or less on his face. 
(T. 107-08). 
Kevin was not sure that defendant was high; he thought 
3 
defendant might just have been lazy (T. 111). Defendant was 
o 
A subsequent defense witness, Michael Gale, who had been 
defendant's neighbor for six or seven years, also testified that 
defendant was lazy, never really wanting to get out and do any 
type of work (T. 622). 
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coherent enough to respond to Ray and appeared to understand his 
surroundingsj it was just that he "sat like a bump on a log" (T. 
94, 98). Both Kevin and Todd observed defendant with enough 
physical coordination to repeatedly throw fish up in the air and 
4 
cut them in half with one of Ray's samurai swords (T. 83). 
About the same time that Todd and Kevin were getting 
the truck started, another family set up camp in the area. The 
Garretts arrived at the south marina around 6:30 or 7:00 in the 
evening. Both Mr. Garrett and his then ten year old son observed 
Ray's truck across the canal (T. 443, 445, 501). The canal area 
is connected by a footbridge and is near a camping and firepit 
5 
area (T. 248, 250). In all, there were about 12 to 13 campers 
in the area, and others there for the day (T. 417). The Garretts 
were the closest campers to the area of Ray's truck, and the only 
ones to hear anything during the night (T. 417, 433-34). 
Early in the evening, the Garretts observed several 
young people on their side of the canal. Mr. Garrett and his son 
observed two vehicles on the other side of the canal. One was 
Ray's truck and the other was a van, according to Mr. Garrett, 
and a large car, according to his son (T. 455, 459, 501). The 
Garrett family heard music which they thought came from a boom 
The victim had two samurai swords with him in the truck. While 
Gloria Walters had not seen the swords at the time Ray and 
defendant left for Willard Bay, she subsequently described the 
swords as Ray's (T. 46). Todd observed the swords both when 
being used to slice the fish in half, and in the back of Ray's 
truck on the way to Todd's house to get his truck (T. 83, 89). 
5 
By agreement of the parties, the jury was transported to 
Willard Bay and viewed the scene (T. 421-23). 
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box type radio in the van (T. 450-51, 487). Because the 
Garrett's son and Mrs. Garrett were sick, the family went to 
sleep when it got dark, about 9:00 or 9:30 (T. 445-46). 
During the night, Mr. and Mrs. Garrett heard one person 
singing and another yelling (T. 448, 487). Both definitely only 
heard only two people and both believed that the voices were 
coming from the area where Ray's truck was (T. 448, 465, 487). 
Mr. Garrett estimated that the yelling occurred sometime between 
11:00 p.m. and 2:00 a.m. (T. 446). For 15 to 20 minutes after he 
heard the yelling, all was quiet. Then, Mr. Garrett heard: 
a shot or shots. Kind of just one episode. 
Then after that a little bit after that the 
music came on again but it was for a short 
time. It wasn't - I don't think it was more 
than a minute long. It might be less than 
that. Then it got quiet after that. 
(T. 448). Mr. Garrett did not look outside his tent to see what 
had occurred but heard a vehicle start up and leave (T. 449). 
Mrs. Garrett remembered the incident somewhat differently. She 
thought that the singing and yelling had occurred closer to when 
she went to bed, about 8:30 or 9:00 p.m. (T. 487). She did not 
connect the singing with the earlier boom box music because that 
van had already left (T. 487). The singing stopped, and then 
sometime in the middle of the night, she heard the shots. 
Afterwards, she heard music for a short time and then nothing (T. 
487-488). She did not hear any vehicle start up (T. 488). The 
Garrett's then ten year old son did not hear any music or shots 
during the night, but at one point, while he got sick outside the 
tent, observed a large car leave the area on the Garrett's side 
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of the canal (T. 499-505). 
In August, 1987, based on information received from 
defendant, Ray's decomposed body was found hidden in some weeds 
in the Willard Bay area (T. 296, 384-86). He had been shot twice 
in the head, by a small caliber weapon, probably a .22 or .25 
caliber (T. 300-01). It appeared that at the time of the 
shooting, Ray was in his sleeping bag and lying with his head on 
a pillow (T. 297, 301). The two wounds were inflicted by two 
different but similar caliber guns, held in parallel position 
approximately nine to eighteen inches above Ray's head and fired 
simultaneously (T. 304, 307-08, 310-11, 332-33, 355-56). Either 
wound would have been fatal (T. 301). 
The nature of the wounds would not have caused 
substantial bleeding (T. 306). Because of the small caliber 
weapons used, the fact that there were two wounds would not have 
been readily apparent without being close to the body and pulling 
back the victim's long hair (T. 306). 
On the morning after the shooting, defendant drove 
Ray's truck to a friend's home, telling him that he had traded a 
stolen car for it (T. 140, 154-55, 192). Defendant and several 
of his friends partied that morning at Cutler Dam with some girls 
(T. 156, 186, 204). While at the dam, they drank beer and 
whiskey and stabbed fish with Ray's samurai swords (T. 169, 180, 
206). Defendant told his friends that he was going to California 
Even though the Garretts had been concerned when they heard the 
shots, they did not report the matter. Instead, the next 
morning, they left the area, as planned, to return home (T. 450). 
In approximately September, 1987, after the victim's body had 
been found, the police contacted the Garretts (T. 676-78). 
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and three of the boys decided to go with him (T. 157). They left 
in Ray's truck (T. 157, 185, 209). 
Along the way, defendant and his friends sold one of 
Ray's samurai swords, his CB radio and other gear in the truck 
for gas money (T. 160-61, 190, 210, 212). In Millard County, 
they were questioned by the police (T. 209). Defendant and one 
of the boys gave the police fictitious names, defendant stating 
7 
he was "Johnny Vicious" (T. 209, 229). The officer checked the 
registration on the vehicle (T. 230). Defendant told the officer 
that he had borrowed the car from Gloria Walters and was going to 
Cedar City where his family lived to seek employment (T. 231). 
The police were not able to contact Gloria for verification, but 
determined that the car had not been reported stolen (T. 231-32). 
After this incident, defendant threw out a lesather 
holster that was in the car. A passing motorist returned it to 
him (T. 211). The leather holster had carried Ray's .22 Rueger, 
the gun defendant subsequently admitted he had thrown away when 
hiding Ray's body (T. 36, 575). 
After Las Vegas, defendant and his friends stopped to 
help a brother and sister in a stranded corvette, Ray Wilks and 
Dominique (T. 194). While helping them, the police again 
approached defendant, asking for the truck's registration. 
Defendant told the police that the truck belonged to his 
girlfriend (T. 199, 214). 
The other two boys hid from the police behind some bushes (T. 
188). 
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Once in California, defendant left his friends in an 
arcade, saying that he would return. He never did (T. 161, 198). 
Approximately two months later, defendant was arrested 
in California for having a loaded firearm in his vehicle, a .25 
o 
caliber semi-automatic (T. 419, 592). Because Utah had an 
outstanding forgery warrant for defendant, the Utah authorities 
were notified of the arrest (T. 285-86). 
On August 6, 1987, while still in custody, defendant 
was interviewed by telephone by Lieutenant Steve Hill of the 
Clearfield City Police (T. 286). At the time of the 
conversation, the officer was aware that Jenkins was listed as a 
missing person and that defendant was the last person known to be 
with him (T. 287). Lt. Hill asked defendant: 
where Ray was, that Ray was reported as 
missing and we were concerned about him, his 
family. And he indicated to me that Ray was 
alive and well and staying in a house in 
Ocean side [sic] or near Ocean Side [sic], 
California. 
(T. 287-88). Defendant stated that he and Ray had gone to 
California together (T. 288). 
The Clearfield police dispatched two officers to 
transport defendant back to Utah. On the way back, defendant 
told one of them that he and Ray had come to California together 
and that Ray was now in Oceanside. Defendant named a specific 
street and described the home where he claimed Ray was staying. 
While defendant subsequently claimed he thought the police were 
o 
This was not Ray Jenkins's gun, the .22 Rueger, which defendant 
testified he threw into Willard Bay (T. 575). There was no 
evidence presented as to any comparison done between this gun and 
the bullets found. 
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asking about Ray Wilks, the officer stated that defendant made 
reference only to "Crazy Ray," which the officer knew to be Ray 
Jenkins's nickname (T. 292-93, 586-87). 
Once in Utah, defendant provided three taped interviews 
to the police concerning the whereabouts of Ray Jenkins (T. 367). 
The first occurred on August 20, 1987 (T. 367). In it, 
defendant admitted that Ray was dead and drew a map of where the 
body was located. Defendant maintained that Ray had committed 
suicide playing Russian roulette with his own .22 Rueger (T. 
369). Defendant stated: 
that [he] and Mr. Jenkins had been camping at 
the area of the south marina and for some 
unknown reason Mr. Jenkins had pulled up this 
firearm. Shot himself in the head and fell 
back. 
(T. 369-370). Defendant said that they were in the back of the 
vehicle, sitting on the tailgate when Ray shot himself. 
Defendant put Ray into his sleeping bag, gathered up the camping 
gear, and dumped the body and gear in an area west of the 
shooting (T. 372). Defendant stated that Ray had only fired one 
shot (T. 371). After giving this statement, defendant took the 
police to Willard Bay area where he claimed he had dumped the 
body, but no body could be found (T. 373-75). 
On August 24, 1987, a second taped interview was given 
(T. 368). At first defendant repeated the facts of his first 
statement, but when other officers, whom defendant knew, came out 
from behind a hidden screen, defendant broke down crying (T. 379-
80). Defendant then told the police that they would find two 
bullet holes in the body, and "indicated very quietly that it was 
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an accident." He did not explain how it was an "accident" (T. 
381). Defendant drew another map for the body location. Again, 
no body was found (T. 382-83). 
On August 26, 1987# the third interview took place (T. 
368). The police discussed the inconsistencies in defendant's 
prior statements. Defendant then stated that: 
while he and Mr. Jenkins were sitting on the 
back of the vehicle, Mr. Jenkins again shot 
himself in the head, fell back in the truck 
and while he was back in the truck he was 
calling Mr. Pendergrass' name. So Mr. 
Pendergrass picked up the gun and clipped 
him in back of the truck and shot him. 
. . . 
He indicated that Mr. Jenkins called out his 
name and he climbed in the back of the truck, 
put him out of his misery and shot him in the 
head with the same gun. With the same gun 
which Jenkins had used. 
(T. 392, 395). This time defendant drew a map and took the 
police to a different area of Willard Bay than before and the 
police recovered the body (T. 384-85, 386). Ray Jenkins's 
skeletonized body was found in his sleeping bag; over it was a 
large piece of carpeting and wood and foam which had been in the 
back of Ray's truck; over this were torn off cattails (T. 296, 
387). Ray's pillow was found about 12 to 15 feet away. Two 
bullets were subsequently discovered in the pillow (T. 345-47, 
389). Ray's gun was never located. Defendant told the police 
that he had thrown the gun away when hiding the body (T. 390). 
At trial, defendant admitted that the prior statements 
were for the most part lies (T. 574, 588, 589-90, 593). He 
testified that he and Ray had been using drugs throughout the 
afternoon and evening (T. 567-69). Defendant claimed that on the 
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way to Willard Bay, he and Ray had shared a joint of marijuana 
and then purchased a twelve pack of beer (T. 566-67). From a 
friend, he obtained an "eight ball" of cocaine, about 3 grams, 
and two to three grams of crystal methane (speed) (T. 567). 
Between 3:00 p.m. and approximately 6:30 p.m., defendant stated 
that he consumed one half joint, eight beers, one quarter crystal 
methane, one and a half grams cocaine, and vaguely recalled 
consuming the remainder of the cocaine at some point (T. 584). 
He testified that he remembered little of the evening, and did 
not hear any shots or music during the night (T. 568, 570, 575). 
In the morning, he awoke to find Ray dead in his sleeping bag. 
He panicked and took off, dumping the body and anything bloody 
into the bushes (T. 571-72). Since the truck was stuck, he asked 
some fishermen to help him, which they did. He then went to his 
friend's home (T. 573). He and his friend got the othesr friends, 
went to the dam to party, and eventually left for California (T. 
573-74). He had no explanation for why he threw the gun away 
with the body (T. 575). 
Corwin Hess testified that while both he and defendant 
were incarcerated in the Box Elder jail, defendant told him: 
that he [defendant] was out camping out at 
Willard Bay with one of his friends and that 
him and his friend I guess he wanted to go to 
California for something and wanted to use 
his friend's truck. And at first his friend 
told him he was going to let him. But I 
guess at one point in the night they got in 
an argument and got in a fight. He decided 
not to take him. 
(T. 257). Defendant's friend got in his sleeping bag and went to 
sleep. Defendant told Hess that defendant: 
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got a gun from someplace. I [Hess] don't 
remember whether it was out of the truck or 
where it came from and said he shot him in 
the head twice and drug him over to the weeds 
and covered him up with a sheet of plywood. 
(T. 258). 
Other evidence will be discussed in the body of this 
brief, as pertinent to the specific arguments. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The trial court has discretion to instruct the jury as 
appropriate to the facts of the case, and no error was committed 
in failing to instruct on the lesser included offense of 
manslaughter or in instructing the jury on accomplice. 
The trial court properly refused to allow qualified 
experts to testify to their opinion of the effect of defendant's 
claimed intoxication on his ability to form the requisite intent, 
where the defendant failed to provide a sufficient factual 
foundation as to what drugs had been consumed and over what time 
period. Even if error was committed, it was harmless in light of 
defendant's defense that he did not commit the crime at all. 
The trial court did not restrict defendant from 
presenting his hypnotically enhanced testimony. Even if 
defendant had been restricted, this issue was not properly raised 
below and defendant has waived it for purposes of appeal. Aside 
from waiver, defendant has never claimed any prejudice; thus, any 
error by the trial court would be harmless beyond a reasonable 
doubt• 
The evidence, together with its reasonable inferences, 
is sufficient to sustain defendant's conviction for murder in the 
second degree. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY REFUSED TO INSTRUCT 
THE JURY ON THE LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSE OF 
MANSLAUGHTER WHERE THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE UPON 
WHICH THE JURY COULD HAVE REASONABLY 
ACQUITTED DEFENDANT OF THE GREATER CHARGE AND 
CONVICTED HIM OF THE LESSER. 
The Utah appellate courts have consistently held that 
the determination of appropriate jury instructions is within the 
sound discretion of the trial court. State v. Lopez# 789 P.2d 
39, 45 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). As such, a trial court's ruling on 
instructions will only be reviewed for a clear abuse of 
discretion, and reversed solely for prejudicial error. State v. 
Hansen, 734 P.2d 421, 428 (Utah 1986); State v. Knight, 734 P.2d 
913, 919-920 (Utah 1987). 
However, due process entitles a defendant to have the 
jury instructed on his theory of the case. Beck v. Alabama, 447 
U.S. 625, 637 (1980); State v. Oldroyd, 685 P.2d 551, 555 (Utah 
1984). But, this right is not absolute; it is limited by the 
evidence presented at trial. State v. Baker, 671 P.2d 152, 157 
(Utah 1983). Thus, where as here, a defendant requests an 
instruction on a lesser included offense, the trial court is 
obligated to give the requested instruction only where: 
there is a 'rational basis for a verdict 
acquitting the defendant of the offense 
charged and convicting him of the included 
offense.' 
State v. Larocco, 135 Utah Adv. Rep. 16, 17 (Utah May 30, 1990) 
(quoting State v. Baker, 671 P.2d at 159). It is not sufficient 
that the evidence simply provides a basis to acquit of the 
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greater offense, it must "simultaneously" provide a rational 
basis for the jury to convict of the lesser. State v. Larocco, 
135 Utah Adv. Rep. at 17; State v. Shabata, 678 P.2d 785, 790 
(Utah 1984); State v. Crick, 675 P.2d 527, 531 (Utah 1983). 
In the instant case, there is no question that 
manslaughter would be considered a lesser included offense of 
second degree murder. State v. Crick, 675 P.2d at 529. There 
was no dispute on this in the lower court. Rather, the issue 
before the trial court was whether, based on the evidence, there 
was a rational basis on which the jury could convict defendant of 
the lesser offense (T. 631). To properly make such a 
determination, the court was obligated to view the evidence in 
the light most favorable to defendant and then, applying an 
evidence-based standard, evaluate if a rational basis for 
conviction existed. State v. Crick, 675 P.2d at 532; State v. 
Baker, 671 P.2d at 157. Here, the trial court properly did so. 
The trial court noted that to convict defendant of 
manslaughter, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-205 (1990), the 
jury would have to determine that defendant caused the death of 
Ray Jenkins unlawfully and recklessly, disregarding a substantial 
and unjustifiable risk with respect to the circumstances 
surrounding his conduct, and that disregarding the risk 
constituted a great deviation from the standard of care that an 
ordinary person would exercise under all the circumstances (T. 
631). Accord State v. Bolsinqer, 699 P.2d 1214, 1219-20 (Utah 
1985); State v. Fontana, 680 P.2d 1042, 1045-46 (Utah 1984) 
(analyzing what constitutes depraved indifference for purposes of 
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the second degree murder statute as opposed to mere 
recklessness). The court then directly asked counsel what 
evidence supported such a theory where defendant was maintaining 
that he did not kill Ray Jenkins under any circumstances (T. 583, 
631). Defense counsel offered in support: 
1. that defendant in his August 24 statement 
to the police said it was an accident (T. 
632); 
2. that defendant stated he did not kill 
Jenkins, that he could not kill his 
friend (T. 632); and 
3. that defendant stated that Jenkins killed 
himself while playing Russian roulette 
(T. 633). 
The trial court properly concluded that such evidence was legally 
insufficient to provide a basis for manslaughter (T. 634). 
Specifically, the court noted, and defense counsel agreed, that 
the statement that it was an accident was not, in context, 
equivalent to saying that defendant accidently killed the victim 
(T. 632-633). (See original statement, T. 380-382). Further, 
defendant, while on the stand, admitted that his prior statement 
to the police that Jenkins had been playing Russian roulette at 
the time of his death was a lie (T. 588, 634). As stated 
succinctly by defendant in his testimony, his defense was not 
that of reckless conduct due to intoxication, it was that someone 
else shot Jenkins (T. 583). Under these facts, a manslaughter 
instruction was precluded by defendant's own theory of the case. 
State v. Shabata, 678 P.2d at 790 (manslaughter instruction 
inappropriate where the defense is that the defendant did not 
kill the victim); State v. Crick, 675 P.2d at 534 (if jury 
believed defendant's denial of any involvement in killing, 
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conviction on either the greater or lesser offense would be 
precluded). 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY EXERCISED ITS 
DISCRETION IN PRECLUDING THE TESTIMONY OF THE 
EXPERT WITNESSES ON GROUNDS OF LACK OF 
FOUNDATION. 
Defendant argues that the trial court improperly 
excluded the opinion testimony of expert witnesses on the issue 
of what effect defendant's ingestion of drugs would have had on 
his ability to form the requisite mental state for murder. In 
doing so, defendant contends that if an expert is qualified, he 
may always give his opinion as long as the facts relied on are of 
the type reasonably relied upon by experts in the field (Br. of 
App. at 15-16). The error of defendant's argument is focusing on 
the types of facts relied on, rather than their adequacy. 
There is no question that rules 702 and 703, Utah Rules 
of Evidence, allow a qualified expert to render an opinion based 
on otherwise inadmissible information, if the underlying 
information is of the type reasonably relied upon by experts in 
that particular field in rendering opinions. But, this is not 
without limitation. The trial court must, as in any other 
evidentiary matter, determine if the facts relied upon provide a 
sufficient foundation for the opinion. "The critical factor is 
whether the expert has knowledge that can assist the trier of 
fact in resolving the issues before it." Schindler v. Schindler, 
776 P.2d 84, 89 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). In making this 
determination, the trial court has "considerable latitude of 
discretion in the admissibility of expert testimony, and in the 
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absence of a clear showing of abuse, [the appellate court] will 
not reverse." Lamb v. Banqart, 525 P.2d 602, 607-08 (Utah 1974). 
Accord State v. Schreuder, 726 P.2d 1215, 1225 (Utah 1986); State 
v. Clayton, 646 P.2d 723, 726 (Utah 1982). 
Here, the trial court concluded that Dr. C. A. Hilton, 
a clinical psychologist, and Dr. Harvey P. Wheelwright, a 
psychiatrist, were generally qualified to comment on the effect 
of drugs on an individual (T. 650). However, when the defendant 
attempted to solicit their specific opinions on whether or not 
the alleged ingestion of drugs by defendant on May 27th could 
have affected his ability to form the requisite intent for 
homicide, the court precluded their testimony (T. 670, 688-89). 
The court concluded: 
The rule of evidence relative to the reliable 
testimony of an expert does not allow 
speculation. Based on what I've heard here 
today, these two doctors are prepared to 
testify that — they are prepared to tell us 
that they can give an opinion relative to the 
defendant's state of mind between eleven and 
two o'clock. This court concludes that their 
testimony is nothing more than speculation. 
There's simply too many things they don't 
know about what the defendant's situation was 
between six o'clock and eleven o'clock. 
Including some of which are the amount of 
drugs involved. The amount of drugs consumed 
by this person as opposed to Mr. Jenkins or 
some other party who may have been there or 
whether they were consumed at all. The time 
period for which they were consumed. The 
purity or potency of drugs or the effect of 
poly-drugs poly-medications on the body. The 
court concludes that testimony is unreliable. 
Is based on speculation. And so therefore, 
I'm going to sustain the objection. I don't 
want to put all that in front of jury. 
That's why I brought you in here. This Court 
does not consider the proffer of testimony by 
Dr. Hilton and Dr. Wheelwright to be 
substantially and sufficiently based upon 
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reliable information upon which they may 
express to this jury an opinion as to the 
defendant's ability to form the necessary or 
requisite intent at the time in question* 
Therefore motion is [sic] and objection is 
sustained. 
(T. 688-89). 
The State recognizes that the Utah Supreme Court has 
stated that a defendant should be allowed to present evidence, 
including expert evidence, which would tend to negate any 
specific intent charged. State v. Miller# 677 P.2d 1129 (Utah 
1984). However, this view has only been applied where the 
evidence presented would have been consistent with a defendant's 
denial that he was not culpable due to his lack of intent. Id. 
at 1132. Compare State v. Schreuder, 726 P.2d at 1222 (testimony 
allowed to disprove defendant's claim that co-defendant/witness 
acted independently of her influence and direction). Here, as 
previously stated, the defense was not that defendant was 
intoxicated at the time of the murder, but that he was not 
involved in the murder in any way (T. 583). Only on appeal has 
defendant argued that if he did kill Jenkins, he did so in an 
intoxicated state (Br. of App. at 13-14). 
More specifically, there was insufficient factual data 
for the experts to draw any conclusion as to defendant's state of 
mind at the time of the killing. 
Dr. Hilton stated that any opinion of his would be 
based simply on an assumption that the facts related to him by 
defendant, a year after the crime, were truthful. He compared it 
to discussing whether someone was guilty of drunk driving without 
having the benefit of a blood-alcohol level, stating: 
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So in reality# there isn't any scientific 
basis anybody can argue from in terms of drug 
levels. 
(T. 642). His only knowledge of what drugs had been consumed, 
and when, was defendant's statement to him, which was: 
They had — there were a large amount of 
mixed drugs and alcohol. They had an eight 
pack of beer. And he [defendant] figured he 
probably had at least eight of that — or 
twelve pack and he had about eight of the 
twelve, perhaps ten of the twelve. Mr. 
Jenkins had a stomach condition and did not 
drink alcohol very much, though he used a lot 
of other substances. They had smoked some 
marijuana. And I think I was asking about, 
you know, how good was the marijuana and he 
was rating it not great but good, strong 
marijuana. They stopped at a friend's house 
who was a dealer and shot some crystal meth. 
They picked up some cocaine which they call 
an eight ball like three to three and a half 
grams of cocaine. Had small needles to 
inject that with and part of that he 
injected. And then the other part he was 
cooking up and smoking. So the cocaine was 
in the form of what we call crack and it was 
rock cocaine. A little more potent, lasts a 
little less longer but hits very hard. It's 
one of his favorite drugs. So he had beer, 
marijuana, methadrine speed, and crack form. 
And coke in crack form. It was crystallized. 
(T. 653-54). The doctor testified that defendant told him he had 
consumed the above drugs between 3:00 p.m. and 9:30 p.m. (T. 
654). When objections were made by the prosecutor to the doctor 
rendering an opinion as to defendant's state of mind between 
11:00 p.m. and 2:00 a.m., the time of the killing, the court 
sustained the objections on foundational grounds in that there 
was insufficient foundation as to what drugs were taken when and 
in what amounts (T. 657). 
Additional questions were asked to which the doctor 
responded: 
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The marijuana they smoked early afternoon say 
one o'clock. They had smoked a joint. They 
picked up the beer after three o'clock. They 
stopped at the dealer's house I think when he 
told me first. He wasn't exactly sure 
whether that was before or after, but when I 
subsequently asked him, he clarified that. 
The coke he said was three and a half grams. 
They got that about four. That was between 
say on, three, four and getting out to 
Willard Bay around five o'clock. It's about 
an hour apart, I think, for starting on the 
drugs. They shot a quarter gram of crystal 
meth at the dealer's house when they picked 
up the coke. That was kind of like a little 
welcome thing as part of the deal. And they 
started using the coke. He also had some 
crystal meth that he himself had 
manufactured. And it was out there too. So 
you can say on the alcohol, for example, 
that's thes [sic] only drug we know. We know 
what's in a can of beer. That's one we know 
and the percent. His size and weight you can 
calculate saying 180 pound person who 
consumes so many cans of beer, your liver 
will clear about a can of beer an hour 
roughly. So he would have been say legally 
drunk by four o'clock in the afternoon. . . . 
(T. 658-59). The doctor continued to explain that even though 
defendant told him he was trying to "stay up" with the drugs by 
using again about every hour, at this point defendant's memory 
got "very fuzzy," "very flakey," and defendant "couldn't remember 
exactly what he did after, what did happen after about six or 
seven o'clock" (T. 660). Defendant did remember that he was out 
of drugs by the time it was dark, about 9:00 or 9:30 p.m. (T. 
661). Again, objections were made to the hypothetical question 
and sustained on the basis of form and foundation (T. 662-64, 
666). The court noted its concern that there was still 
insufficient foundation as to when and what was actually consumed 
by defendant (T. 667-68). The court continued to allow the 
defense an opportunity to establish adequate foundation. Counsel 
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attempted a few more questions and then stated to the court, 
•'Well, your honor, I guess we just can't give you the quality or 
the quantity" (T. 670). To which the court responded that the 
doctor was not in a "position to testify as to what effect the 
consumption of certain unquantified drugs could have on an 
individual" (T. 670). Defense counsel stated, "Okay. That's all 
I have" (T. 670). 
Similarly, when Dr. Wheelwright testified, the trial 
court properly restricted his opinion. Dr. Wheelwright's 
information was based on a review of Dr. Hilton's report and a 
conversation with defendant during trial (T. 673). On voir dire, 
Dr. Wheelwright admitted that to render a valid opinion he would 
need to know the length of time over which any drugs were 
consumed. In this case, defendant related to the doctor that he 
began taking drugs at 3:45 p.m. and continued to about 8:30 or 
9:00 p.m., but could not remember, except for brief periods, 
anything after 5:00 or 6:00 p.m. (T. 677). The timing of what he 
took was also "a little vague." Basically, defendant told the 
doctor that he must have consumed all or most of the drugs 
between 3:45 and 6:00 p.m. because there were none left in the 
morning (T. 678). The doctor was not sure if the amount of 
marijuana was smoked by defendant only or shared with another (T. 
679). Defendant told him that approximately "15 hits or doses of 
a quarter gram each" of cocaine had been smoked between 4:00 and 
6:00 p.m., but did not specify how much had been used by Jenkins 
or his "friends" (T. 680). When questioned as to defendant's 
inconsistent statements that he had smoked the cocaine every 
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fifteen to twenty minutes between 4:00 and 6:00 p.m.# i.e., six 
hits or lines, and that he had smoked ten or fifteen lines (T. 
680, 682), the doctor repeated that defendant had just assumed he 
had taken that much because it was all gone in the morning and 
drug users typically use whatever is available (T. 682-83). 
Further, the doctor admitted that it would make a difference in 
rendering an accurate opinion to know what, if anything, 
defendant had consumed between 6:00 and 11:00 p.m., and how the 
drugs were consumed (T. 684-685). The doctor stated that while 
there was research on the effects of individual drugs, there was 
no "solid scientific research" of the ultimate effects of poly-
drug intoxication (T. 686). Thereafter, the court concluded that 
there was insufficient foundation for Dr. Wheelwright's opinion 
to be anything but mere speculation (T. 688-89). 
It is clear that the trial court, given the 
insufficiency of the facts concerning what drugs had been 
consumed and when, properly exercised its discretion in 
sustaining the objections to the hypothetical questions as asked. 
But, even assuming arguendo that the trial court erred, any error 
would be harmless. Indeed, defendant has not even alleged on 
appeal that he was prejudiced (Br. of App., Point II). Testimony 
was presented through various witnesses, including defendant, 
that at least at 6:00 p.m. on May 27th, he appeared to be under 
the influence of drugs or alcohol (T. 91, 107-08, 528, 553, 568). 
Even the experts were allowed to state that based on defendant's 
statements, defendant could have been considered legally drunk 
and had consumed a large amount of potent drugs (T. 659, 674). 
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Clearly, the defense was not precluded from presenting evidence 
of drug use. The problem was that no one, including defendant, 
could relate any facts about what occurred after 6s00 p.m., some 
five to eight hours prior to the time of the killing. Further, 
whatever state of mind defendant had at the time of the killing 
has little determinative value as to the jury's determination of 
whether or not defendant was involved in the killing. Defendant 
never argued that his drug intoxication negated any requisite 
intent; instead, he argued that the intoxication was supportive, 
and corroborative of defendant's testimony that he did not know 
what had happened (T\ 583, 717-18). Even if the experts had 
expressed an opinion as to defendant's ability to form any 
requisite intent, such testimony would not have had a substantial 
likelihood of affecting the outcome of defendant's case. As 
such, its exclusion, even if error, is harmless. State v. 
Knight, 734 P.2d 913, 919-20 (Utah 1987). 
POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY EXERCISED ITS 
DISCRETION IN INSTRUCTING THE JURY CONCERNING 
ACCOMPLICES. 
As previously stated in Point I of this brief, the 
trial court's determination of what jury instructions are 
appropriate, based on the evidence in a case, is within the 
court's sound exercise of discretion. 
Here, the court instructed the jury that: 
Every person, who acts with the mental 
state required for the commission of an 
offense, who solicits, requests, commands, 
encourages, or intentionally aids another 
person or persons to engage in conduct which 
constitutes an offense, shall be equally 
-26-
guilty as the person who directly commits the 
offense. 
(R. 597, Court's Instruction No. 7). As defendant concedes, the 
instruction merely tracks the language of the aiding and abetting 
statute, Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-202 (1990) (Br. of App. at 19). 
When defendant objected to the instruction, the court responded 
that it was a jury issue as to whether or not defendant aided the 
other persons he was contending had committed the murder (T. 
691). 
Defendant argues on appeal that the instruction was 
improper because no one else was ever charged (Br. of App. at 19-
20). Such an argument is specious in light of Utah Code Ann. 
S 76-2-203 (1990), which states; 
In any prosecution in which an actor's 
criminal responsibility is based on the 
conduct of another, it is no defense: 
. . . 
(2) That the person for whose conduct 
the actor is criminally responsible has been 
acquitted, has not been prosecuted or 
convicted, has been convicted of a different 
offense or of a different type of class of 
offense or is immune from prosecution. 
Defendant's other argument, that the evidence did not 
support such an instruction, is equally without merit. Here, the 
State's primary theory was that defendant had committed the 
crime. In refuting this, the defense presented testimony from 
Mr. Garrett that at sometime prior to the shooting, other persons 
appeared to be with defendant and the victim, and, at the time of 
the shooting, that another vehicle left the area (T. 488-89). 
Additionally, based on the different markings on the recovered 
bullets, the State's expert ballistic witness testified that two 
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guns appeared to have been used simultaneously (T. 308, 313, 
355-56, 359-60). There was no dispute that defendant was with 
Ray Jenkins at the time he was killed, that defendant hid 
Jenkins' body and much of the bloody evidence, that he threw away 
Jenkins' gun such that it was never discovered, that he took 
Jenkins' truck to California, and that he lied to his friends as 
to how he got the truck. Further, defendant gave the police 
conflicting statements as to what occurred on the night in 
question, including giving false information as to where the body 
was. Based on the evidence, the jury could have concluded that 
more than one person was involved in Jenkins' death, but that, 
defendant's presence at the scene, concealment of the body and 
evidence afterwards, and direct benefit of receiving Jenkins' 
truck and belongings negated his claim that he did not 
participate in the crime. As such, an accomplice instruction was 
appropriate. See State v. McCardell, 652 P.2d 942, 945 (Utah 
1982) (aiding instruction proper where defendant present at time 
of presentation of check but claiming that another forged it). 
POINT IV 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT RESTRICT DEFENDANT'S 
TESTIMONY ON GROUNDS THAT IT HAD NOT BEEN 
HYPNOTICALLY ENHANCED; AND, DEFENDANT FAILED 
TO PROPERLY RAISE OR PRESERVE THIS ISSUE FOR 
PURPOSES OF APPEAL. 
Defendant contends that the trial court committed 
constitutional error by allegedly restricting defendant from 
identifying which parts of his testimony had been hypnotically 
enhanced. Further, he urges this Court to remand the case for a 
determination of whether procedural safeguards were used when 
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defendant was hypnotized (Br. of App. at 22). Notably, 
defendant, while arguing error, does not even raise the issue of 
whether or not defendant's presentation of evidence was 
prejudiced. 
Defendant appropriately begins his discussion with Rock 
v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44 (1987), but misapplies its holding. 
Rock v. Arkansas, as defendant notes, held that a state may not 
impose a per se prohibition against hypnotically enhanced 
testimony such that a defendant is arbitrarily denied an 
opportunity to testify. Ld. at 61. The Court did not "endorse 
without qualifications the use of hypnosis as an investigative 
tool;" its concern was with a wholesale prevention of all of a 
defendant's testimony. J^ i. But, nothing in the decision shifted 
defendant's foundational burden to establish that proper 
procedural safeguards were utilized in hypnotizing a defendant, 
such that the post-hypnotic testimony had some trustworthiness 
and reliability. Ixi. at 60-61. Accord State v. Holden, 554 
So.2d 121, 126-127 (La.App.2 Cir. 1989) ("The party seeking to 
introduce hypnotically enhanced testimony has the burden of 
establishing admissibility by clear and convincing evidence," 
even where the testimony is that of defendant's); State v. Alley, 
776 S.W.2d 506, 516 (Tenn. 1989), cert, denied, 110 S. Ct. 758 
(1990) (reliability is still a weighing factor the court must 
consider before admitting hypnotically enhanced statements of a 
defendant); People v. Romero, 745 P.2d 1003, 1021 (Colo. 1987), 
cert, denied, 485 U.S. 990 (1988) (proponent of hypnotically 
enhanced testimony must establish its reliability by clear and 
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convincing evidence). As the Utah Supreme Court has noted, the 
holding in Rock must be narrowly applied. State v. Tuttle# 780 
P.2d 1203, 1211 n.9 (Utah 1989), cert, denied, 110 S. Ct. 1323 
(1990). 
Apparently sometime prior to trial, defendant was 
hypnotized. (See R. 535-37, State's Motion in Limine to Prohibit 
Evidence of Hypnosis). Recognizing that a defendant should not 
arbitrarily be restricted from testifying, the State did not move 
pretrial to factually limit any of defendant's testimony, but 
requested that defendant simply be allowed to testify to his now 
present recall of the events without reference to the fact that 
it was hypnotically enhanced (R. 535-36). The record does not 
evidence any response to the motion by defendant or any hearing 
on the matter. 
When defendant testified, the State raised no 
objections to any portion of that testimony on the grounds that 
defendant's memory had been hypnotically enhanced (T. 556-75). 
Nor did the State cross-examine defendant by distinguishing 
specifically his pre- and post-hypnotic recall (T. 576-98). The 
State did refer twice to prior statements of defendant's made to 
Dr. Hilton, but did not in any way refer to those statements as 
o 
having been made under hypnosis (T. 597-98). Despite this, on 
redirect, defense counsel asked: 
Dr. Hilton interviewed defendant for purposes of evaluating his 
sanity (R. 94, 106). Additionally, the defense requested 
separately that defendant be hypnotized (R. 87-88). It is 
unclear from the record when and by whom defendant was 
hypnotized. 
-30-
Q [Mr. Dorius] You indicated on cross 
examination that you could recall some of 
these items because of hypnotism? 
A [Defendant] Yes, sir. 
Q You've been hypnotized? 
Mr. Bunderson: Could we approach the 
bench, your honor. 
(T. 598). An off-the-record conference then occurred (T. 598-
99). When court resumed, defense counsel proceeded with other 
questions. 
No further mention of hypnosis occurred until after 
both parties had rested. At that point, defendant noted an 
exception to Jury Instruction No. 11 on hypnosis (R. 601), in 
that "the defendant only responded that he had been hypnotized, 
but [was] not allowed to testify to any any [sic] hypnotic 
testimony" (T. 691). In response the trial court asked: 
THE COURT: Just a moment. Are you 
suggesting that this court precluded his 
testimony? 
MR. DORIUS. No. 
Defendant has not raised on appeal the issue of the court's 
instruction on hypnosis, except as a passing reference: 
It was reversible error for the trial court 
to prevent the defendant from testifying as 
to which portions of his testimony had been 
refreshed by hypnosis, and to instruct the 
jury concerning hypnotic testimony. 
(Br. of App. at 20). Since no further argument is presented nor 
any authorities cited, it is presumed that defendant has waived 
this issue on appeal. State v. Johnson, 771 P.2d 326, 327-28 
(Utah Ct. App. 1989). Additionally, while there is little 
authority, the courts which have addressed the issue favor a 
cautionary instruction when hypnotically enhanced testimony is 
presented. Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. at 61; State v. Holden, 
554 So.2d at 126. See also 101 Harv. L. Rev. 119, 124 (1987) 
(noting jury's tendency to unduly credit hypnotically refreshed 
testimony). 
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THE COURT: What's the objection then? He 
did testify that some of his testimony was in 
fact remembered after hypnosis. 
MR. DORIUS: But the Court granted the 
State's exception for the defendant to ask 
any questions regarding what the hypnotic 
testimony was. 
THE COURT: Say that again. 
MR. DORIUS: I say the State's objection was 
upheld by the Court from the defendant 
introducing any evidence or asking any 
testimony as to what the hypnotic testimony 
was that he had recollected. 
MR. BUNDERSON: You mean you felt you were 
barred from specifying that portion which was 
hypnotically enhanced? 
MR. DORIUS: That's correct. 
THE COURT: That question wasn't asked and 
any evidence which was hypnotically enhanced 
would be excluded anyway. But you didn't ask 
the question which testimony he was giving. 
He simply answered the question his 
recollection was helped because of hypnosis. 
MR. DORIUS: As I understood, we were not 
able to proceed asking any questions 
regarding which of the testimony had been 
hypnotically enhanced. 
THE COURT: That wasn't the Court's intention 
nor was that question asked. Because of the 
inference was given by the witness that 
certain of his testimony was hypnotically 
enhanced, the instruction was proffered. 
MR. DORIUS: I believe that's the only 
exceptions I have. 
(T. 691-92.) 
rhe trial court did not unconstitutionally restrict defendant 
from testifying. Counsel simply did not raise or argue the 
issue, if there was one, as to any other aspects of the hypnotic 
testimony he wished to present. State v. Eldredqe, 773 P.2d 29, 
35 (Utah 1989), cert, denied, 110 S. Ct. 62 (1989). 
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Further, even if counsel had timely raised the issue 
below, the record does not in any way reflect what aspects of 
defendant's testimony related to pre- or post-hypnotic recall. 
Nor has defendant even specified such on appeal. Even assuming 
arguendo that the trial court erred, defendant has totally failed 
to identify how this error could have prejudiced him. Therefore, 
this Court must presume that any error would be harmless. State 
v. Knight# 734 P.2d at 919-920. See also State v. Julian, 771 
P.2d 1061, 1063 (Utah 1989), and cases cited therein (defendant 
has burden of establishing prejudice). 
POINT IV 
THERE IS SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO SUSTAIN 
DEFENDANT'S CONVICTION FOR MURDER IN THE 
SECOND DEGREE. 
Defendant contends that the evidence adduced at trial 
is insufficient to support his conviction for murder in the 
second degree as defined, in pertinent part, under Utah Code Ann. 
S 76-5-203 (1990), which reads: 
(1) Criminal homicide constitutes murder in 
the second degree if the actor: 
(a) intentionally or knowingly causes 
the death of another; 
(b) intending to cause serious bodily 
injury to another, he commits an act clearly 
dangerous to human life that causes the death 
of another; 
(c) acting under circumstances 
evidencing a depraved indifference to human 
life, he engages in conduct which creates a 
grave risk of death to another and thereby 
causes the death of another[.] 
Defendant does not challenge his conviction for theft (Br. of 
App. at 22-25). 
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Here, the jury was fully advised as to each element of 
the offense charged. (See R. 590-621, Court's Instructions to 
the Jury). No issue has been raised on appeal as to th€> adequacy 
of the jury instructions except as to the manslaughter emd 
accomplice instructions, discussed previously. 
The standard for review of a sufficiency of the 
evidence challenge is well-established by the Utah appellate 
courts. 
[T]he evidence and the reasonable inferences 
which may be drawn therefrom must be viewed 
in the light most favorable to the jury 
verdict. A jury conviction is reversed for 
insufficient evidence only when the evidence, 
so viewed, is sufficiently inconclusive or 
inherently improbable that reasonable minds 
must have entertained a reasonable doubt that 
the defendant committed the crime of which he* 
was convicted. 
State v. Johnson, 774 P.2d 1141, 1147 (Utah 1989). Accord State 
v. Jonas, 135 Utah Adv. Rep. 38, 39 (Utah Ct. App. May 22, 1990); 
State v. Jamison, 767 P.2d 134, 137 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). 
Further, since a jury is in the best position to give "proper 
weight to the peripheral nature of [any] contradictory 
testimony," State v. Lactod, 761 P.2d 23, 28 (Utah Ct. App. 
1988): 
It is not this court's duty to measure 
conflicting evidence or the credibility of 
witnesses. That responsibility belongs 
strictly to the trier of fact. 'It is the 
exclusive function of the jury to weigh the 
evidence and to determine the credibility of 
the witnesses' . . . . So long as there is 
some evidence, including reasonable 
inferences, from which findings of all 
requisite elements of the crime can 
reasonably be made, [the court's] inquiry 
stops. • • • 
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J^ L at 27 (quoting State v. Booker, 709 P.2d 342, 345 (Utah 1985) 
(citations omitted)). Accord State v. Hopkinsf 782 P.2d 475 
(Utah 1989) (an appellate court "does not have the prerogative to 
substitute its judgment on the credibility of witnesses for that 
of the fact-finder"). 
Unless the prosecution's account of the facts appears 
to be so lacking and insubstantial that the jury must necessarily 
have entertained a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed 
the crime charged, a reviewing court is obligated to assume the 
jury believed the evidence which supports the jury's verdict. 
State v. Brooks, 631 P.2d 878, 884 (Utah 1981). Nor will a 
conviction be overturned merely because the jury chose to 
disbelieve the defendant. State v. Lactodf 761 P.2d at 27. 
Accord State v. Jonas, 135 Utah Adv. Rep. at 40. It is the 
jury's prerogative to determine the facts. Further, the State's 
burden in a circumstantial case is no different than its burden 
in any case, that is, to prove defendant's guilt beyond a 
reasonable doubt. State v. Cloud, 722 P.2d 750, 755-56 (Utah 
1986); State v. Hansen, 710 P.2d 182, 183 (Utah 1985). 
Viewed in the light most favorable to the jury's 
verdict, there was sufficient evidence that defendant killed Ray 
Jenkins. By defendant's own testimony, he was the only person 
known to be with the victim at the time of his death. The 
unrefuted evidence established that prior to going to Willard 
Bay, defendant and the victim argued about defendant taking Ray's 
truck to California (T. 70-71). During the night, the Garretts 
heard yelling from the direction of defendant and Ray's camp area 
-35-
(T. 448/ 487). The next morning, defendant hid Ray's body and 
all the evidence of the crime (T. 372, 387, 389, 390, 571-72). 
He then proceeded to take Ray's truck and party with his friends 
(T. 152, 156, 183, 206). He told no one about Ray or how he had 
truely come to acquire the truck (T. 593). When questioned by 
the police, he falsified accounts of what happened (T. 527, 588, 
589-90). Prior to the discovery of the body, defendant told the 
police that Ray had been shot twice, a fact which Dr. Sweeney had 
testified would not have been readily apparent without looking 
closely at the body and pulling back Ray's hair (T. 306, 380). 
He admitted at one point to the police that he had shot 
Ray "to put him out of his misery" after Ray had shot himself but 
while he was still alive (T. 392, 395). He admitted to at least 
one, and possibly two jail inmates, that he had killed Ray (T. 
222, 225-26, 257-58). 
The only evidence which defendant can point to in 
support of his theory that someone else shot Ray is that two 
weapons were used and that Mr. Garrett thought he heard a car 
leave the area. As to the former, the expert testimony was that 
while it appeared that two different weapons were used, they were 
used simultaneously while in a parallel position (T. 307-08, 310-
11, 313). Further, it would appear inferentially that at least 
one of those weapons was Ray's .22 Rueger. It is true that, 
while several inferences exist as to what other weapon could have 
been used, there was no weapon introduced as the murder weapon. 
However, the State has no burden to produce such evidence where 
there is no dispute that the victim was unlawfully killed by a 
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firearm. It is simply one aspect of the evidence in the same 
category as any other evidence. Its introduction alone would not 
necessarily establish defendant's guilt any more than its absence 
alone can negate his culpability. This is especially true when 
defendant admits he threw away the only weapon found at the scene 
(T. 575). 
As to the Garretts' testimony, the jury was free to 
determine what weight to give it. Mr. Garrett thought he heard, 
but was not in a position to see, a vehicle leave defendant's and 
Ray's side of the canal (T. 449). Mrs. Garrett never heard a 
vehicle leave from any location (T. 487). Their young son saw a 
vehicle leave the Garretts' side of the canal (T. 505). Again, 
in light of all the other evidence, this does not create a 
reasonable doubt as to defendant's guilt. 
Based on the totality of the evidence, together with 
all reasonable inferences, the jury verdict is adequately 
supported by the evidence. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, defendant's convictions for 
murder in the second degree, a first degree felony, and theft, a 
second degree felony, should be affirmed. 
DATED this <£ day of July, 1990. 
R. PAUL VAN DAM 
Attorney General 
CHRISTINE F. SOLTIS 
Assistant Attorney General 
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